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CONVEX AND CONCAVE: CONCEPTUAL
BOUNDARIES IN PSYCHOLOGY, NOW
AND THEN (BUT MAINLY THEN)
By Rick Rylance
MY TITLE is derived from G. H. Lewes’s psychological magnum opus Problems of Life
and Mind (1874–79). Lewes’s image is a metaphor for the relation of mind to brain, or more
generally of the mind to the nervous system: “every mental phenomenon has its corresponding
neural phenomenon (the two being as convex and concave surfaces of the same sphere,
distinguishable yet identical)” (Problems: First Series 1: 112). His point is that, though
the two entities can be analytically distinguished, they are as necessarily linked as the two
surfaces of a bending plane. Like the recto and verso of a sheet of paper, or signifier and
signified in the linguistic sign, one can make an interpretative separation of the two, but not
an ontological one. It is a characteristically deft metaphor by Lewes to express a notoriously
vexed relationship, not only in Victorian psychology but also in modern thinking today.
Lewes’s metaphor implicitly challenges several orthodoxies of nineteenth-century
psychological theory, which I will describe shortly. But it does so by a metaphor that is,
of itself, without boundaries. A line separates itself from what is not itself; it may divide
two entities different from one another. But the curving line is not separable from itself: it
is constituted by interdependent surfaces of a simple geometrical figure. By its very nature,
the metaphor teasingly invites speculation about what constitutes a boundary.
What was challenging about this from the point of view of Victorian psychology? The
metaphor addresses one of its most bothersome conceptual problems, that of the relation
between mind and body. This was troubling to the Victorian conceptual imagination for three
reasons. First, there was the technical issue of how any interconnection between them might
be articulated in terms of a network of physiological and neurological relations. Second,
there was the ontological issue of how apparently unlike things – matter and mind – might
be understood as a single thing. (The specter of materialism always haunts discussion of this
issue.) And third, there is the hornets’ nest of ideological issues stirred to alarm whenever such
matters were raised. These included: the perceived threat to spiritual values; the contamination
of pure mind and the glories of human achievement by connection with the messy (and
morally suspect) body; the threat to the special dignity of human creation distinguished from
that of the animals; the threat to the sense of superior vocation among Caucasian males; the
implied threat to the special autonomy of human consciousness and its ability to exercise free
will; the obliteration of sensitive, personal experience by the brute, tawdry, but purportedly
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objective language of science; the alarming proximity of materialist science to materialist (and
atheist) politics; and so on. Mind-body interactionists, in short, posited too-close relations
between things best kept apart: mind and matter, different species, different races, different
ideas, languages, and above all territories of knowledge. The dispute about such issues in the
Victorian period always contained an element of intellectual turf-war over who was best fitted
to legislate opinion about humankind’s most intimate and noble experience. The boundaries
between science and religion, and between institutional knowledge in the universities and
churches and that developed by the free-lance brigands of opinion publishing in the great
periodicals (especially suspect ones like the pro-science Fortnightly Review whose first editor
was G. H. Lewes), were patrolled and raided by turns (Rylance).
Dominant psychological opinion – that transmitted by Christian teaching for instance –
was, by contrast, hierarchical and separatist. The soul was that part of the human personality
that governed the remainder of the psychological apparatus. Psychologists in this tradition
distinguished the so-called higher faculties, especially those closely related to the soul like
reason, faith, a sense of the numinous, moral discrimination, exercise of the will, and so on,
from the faculties described as lower, like appetite, sense, emotion, and desire. This structure
assumes, first, the control of the lower by the higher, with the related implication that the
former are potentially usurpatory and delinquent; second, the separation of mind from body
in terms of ontological value; third, a further separation of Western man as a generic being
from inferior creatures like, in some accounts, other races or women; and, fourth, the broad
exemption of humanity from the complex and ambiguous determinations of nature. In theory,
the soul psychologically liberated one from the body, distinguished the special capacities of
humanity from those of animals, and – partly as mechanism, partly as unique result – enabled
the exercise of choice, free will, and personal self-determination. It drew a boundary between
mind and its very many others.
Versions of this hierarchy constituted the orthodoxy of the period. Its ubiquity can be
glimpsed in the very etymology of the word psychology which, according to the OED,
settled into a recognizable modern usage in the 1840s. Its establishment in mainstream
usage identified a modern discipline with scientific ambitions. Yet the meaning of the word
in its Greek original is soul discourse, and as such it was widely understood. Coleridge’s
Encyclopaedia Metropolitana, for instance, completed and published in 1845, a decade after
the great man’s death, defined psychology in a simple five-word entry as “The Discourse of the
Soul.” The same line was taken, though at greater length, by most Victorian encyclopaedists
(Rylance 22–24). So it is easy to see how G. H. Lewes’s boundary-less metaphor offends this
orthodoxy by implying uniformity of conceptual structure crossing the boundary between
body and soul. But the classic, Christian version of psychological orthodoxy was not the only
system in Lewes’s sights.
Lewes first conceived of the project that eventually became Problems of Life and Mind
in the early 1860s when his working title was “The Soul and its Mechanism,” a deliberately
goading collation (Kitchel 216). Lewes’s provocation was to juxtapose the tradition of soul-
discourse with that of iatromechanism, its traditional opponent in post-Renaissance bio-
medical thought. The iatromechanical tradition regarded the body as a machine (the word
means medical machinery), and the psychological version controversially refused to make
much distinction between body and mind for key purposes. Taken together, soul-discourse
and iatromechanicalism represent the binary pair that established the grounds for debate in
much Victorian psychological theory.
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Several senior Victorian intellectuals were iatromechanists, like T. H. Huxley:
Sensation is a product of the sensiferous apparatus caused by certain modes of motion which are set
up in it by impulses from without. The sensiferous apparatuses are, as it were, factories, all of which
at the one end receive raw materials of a similar kind – namely, modes of motion – while, at the other,
each turns out a special product, the feeling which constitutes the kind of sensation characteristic of
it. (“Sensation” 269)
Huxley, like Lewes, was a considerable polemicist, and there is, once again, a provoking
edge to this. Knowing the delicacy of the issues he is addressing, Huxley enjoys putting
the matter as bluntly as possible to nettle the sensitivities of his opponents. (The occasion
was a widely reported lecture at the Royal Institution in 1879. It was quickly written up
for periodical publication in one of the controversialists’ favorite outlets, the prestigious
Nineteenth Century.) The late 1870s saw the ascendancy of physiological thinking following
a number of pathbreaking discoveries in the cerebral localization of the faculties of sight
and language (Daston). But it is only a relatively uninhibited moment in a continuing battle.
Huxley’s iatromechanicalism was established early, as he records in his autobiography:
my great desire was to be a mechanical engineer, but the Fates were against this; and, while very
young, I commenced the study of Medicine under a medical brother-in-law. But, though the Institute
of Mechanical Engineers would certainly not own me, I am not sure that I have not, all along, been
a sort of mechanical engineer in partibus infidelium. . . . The only part of my professional course
which really and deeply interested me was Physiology, which is the mechanical engineering of living
machines. . . . (103)
There could not be a more pungent definition of the iatromechanical tradition than that final
phrase: “the mechanical engineering of living machines.”
It is easy to embarrass this line of thinking, though – unlike soul discourse – it has been
remarkably persistent in mainstream psychological theory beyond the age of steam into that
of computers and Artificial Intelligence. Many scientific Victorians took Huxley and others
to task for asserting that humans were warm automata. G. H. Lewes did, for instance, as did
W. B. Carpenter and William James (Lewes, Study 29–38; Carpenter; James 132–47). But
instead of pointing to the category mistakes embedded in the iatromechanical comparison
of human to machine, and the elision of questions of consciousness and agency, it may be a
more telling question to ask why the idea that human beings were like factories appealed at
all. Why did this metaphor appear so captivating to intelligent Victorian people? There seem
to be at least three good reasons.
First, it drew on the glamour of astonishing technology. Associations of this kind excite
the imagination and, in so doing, purloin evidence of workable hypotheses by referring
the unknown directly to the known. According to the historian Georges Canguilhem,
nineteenth-century conceptions of nervous physiology “were based in part upon analogies
with operations or objects which were familiar by dint of construction and/or use of
machines, progress in this branch of physiology, whose discoveries were incorporated into
psychology, earned it widespread recognition” (Canguilhem 122–23; also Jeannerod). Thus
some neurologists, and the psycho-physiologists who followed them, imagined the nervous
system as like the electric telegraph, like controlled explosions, like (as in Huxley) factory
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production lines. Tennyson, in poem CXX of In Memoriam (1850), made a characteristically
mournful joke of it:
I trust I have not wasted breath:
I think we are not wholly brain,
Magnetic mockeries . . .
“Magnetic mockeries” is sometimes glossed as a reference to Robert Chambers’s
controversial Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844), where Chambers speculates
on the relationship between electricity, magnetism and the operation of the cerebrum (A. L.
Tennyson 970–71). But the reference might be more openly topical. Electrical telegraphy
works by the alteration of magnetic fields, such that a distant dial may be made to point to
specified letters or numbers by controlled fluctuations in electrical current. Such a system was
patented in Britain in 1837 and was put extensively into operation during the railway boom
of the 1840s as telegraph wires were laid alongside new track. But it was initially notoriously
unreliable, in ways not unlike modern voice-to-text recognition systems, producing comical
confusions and gobbledegook – hence the “mockeries.” Tennyson’s reference to technological
failure is made in the interests of a position opposed to iatromechanical models and, more
generally, the scientific exploration of the mind. “What matters Science unto men, /At least
to me?” his poem continues – especially, he implies, as it doesn’t work. “No evolutionist,” he
once sharply remarked to John Tyndall, an arch advocate of the materialist position, “is able
to explain the mind of Man or how any possible physiological change of tissue can produce
conscious thought” (H. Tennyson 1: 323). For him, the boundary – the barrier – between
body and mind was ever thus.
But temporary technological setback, and root-and-branch opposition from conservatives
like Tennyson, did not stop the analogy. Alexander Bain, a friend of both Huxley and Lewes,
drew an elaborate neurological metaphor from exactly the same source in The Senses and the
Intellect (1855), arguably the most influential of nineteenth-century psychological textbooks.
What is interesting about Bain’s speculation, and what incidentally distinguishes it from
Huxley’s rather barren image of factory production, is the way telegraphic relays provided
the opportunity to imagine networks of connections. Bain envisages not a closed circuit but a
system of complex links and “centres” (Bain 30–38). George Dyson has recently argued that
it is in the conceptual move from analogies based upon point-to-point or serially sequenced
machinery, to ones based upon diversely connected networks, that the modern impetus to
think about the origins of intelligence and other higher functions is to be found.
But the appeal of mechanical analogies was not merely a matter of technological
glamour. Factories, as in Huxley’s image, are also wealth-producers, and iatromechanical
theory gained by elaborating conceptual structures that imaged the human person in forms
recognizable to authoritative ideologies. In Huxley’s metaphor, humans are productive beings
in a commercial world. “The most important machine is man,” wrote Alfred Marshall, one of
the founders of neo-classical Victorian economics, “and the most important thing produced
is thought” (Schabas 84; see also McReynolds). Writing this in the 1860s, Marshall was
directly influenced by Bain who, in turn, had strong sustained connections with the Millite
wing of philosophical radicalism. So iatromechanical ideas attached themselves not just to
technological advance, but also to wealth production and a dynamic sense of social mobility.
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We can see a reflection of this in the personnel whose work developed the newly named
discipline of psychology. The leading psychologists of the Victorian period were men like
Huxley, Bain, Spencer, Carpenter, and Lewes, all of whom hailed from undistinguished social
backgrounds. Bain held several university posts, but the others were freelance, unattached
intellectuals making their ways, and their ideas, outside the boundaries of established
institutions.
The third reason why iatromechanical concepts appealed to Victorian people lies in
their heuristic benefit. Machine analogies have the slightly oxymoronic advantage of being
not only exciting, but also predictable. Machines are stable systems and can be reverse-
engineered to demonstrate directly the cause from the effect. Machine analogies take the
mysterious and complex and make them comprehensible by familiar comparison by providing
clear causal sequences. Though so different in many respects, the iatromechanical and
spiritualist traditions of nineteenth-century psychology had in common root conceptual
models with fixed structures and clear lines of hierarchy, sequence, and determination.
Both drew boundaries around the body. One tradition aimed to transcend it; the other to
circumscribe its comprehension by a reductive materialism.
It is therefore not difficult to see why Lewes’s alternative metaphor of convex and concave
challenged the accepted structures of determining dependency built into both soul-and-body
and machine sequence models. To ask of the convex and concave surfaces of a bending
plane which has determining priority is a meaningless question. It is this resistance to fixed,
boundary-based models of mind that distinguishes the adventure in thinking that is the best of
the new Victorian psychology. To give its flavor, here briefly is one of Lewes’s characteristic
propositions:
the group is never a fixed structure; it is only a disposition of the elements which is easily reformed;
just as in a Kaleidoscope there are certain groups of the separate pieces of glass which combine now
in one way and now in another, according to impulse. (Problems: Third Series 140–41)
Lewes refers to what he calls “neural groups,” the disposition of neurological elements in
the system. The conception is inevitably vague, though it is interestingly predictive of some
modern thinking on what the Nobel Prize-winning neurobiologist Gerald Edelman calls, with
slight variation, “neuronal groups,” to which we shall return. For Lewes, as for Edelman, these
groups and their functions are produced by patterns of stimulation and activity and not by pre-
established disposition: use, being-in-the-world, determines function. So what is striking –
and strikingly modern – about Lewes’s formulation is, firstly, that this is an energy system
based upon, as he puts it, “impulse”; secondly, it is a system characterized by variability
and adaptability; thirdly, it sees function as a product of selection and iteration not essential
property.
This last point is crucial. It identifies an error to which Lewes objected in the work of
the path-breaking, early nineteenth-century French physiologist Xavier Bichat, for whose
work George Eliot’s medical researcher in Middlemarch, Tertius Lydgate, is an enthusiast.
Lydgate dreams of discovering human propensities, “the first lurking-places of anguish,
mania and crime,” through the identification of “primitive tissue” as a cause of character
and behavior (194; ch. 16). Lydgate’s error – like Bichat’s, according to Lewes (Problems:
Second Series 27) – is to posit a direct correspondence between histology and personal
destiny. “What was the primitive tissue?” Lydgate ponders. But his creator, writing four
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decades later, undercuts his enterprise by remarking that this question was “not quite in the
way required by the awaiting answer” (178; ch. 15.). Lydgate’s intrepid failure as a scientist
(he is at least credited, as Lewes credited Bichat, with fertile error) is to think as both a
reductionist and a determinist, which was certainly not Lewes’s, or Eliot’s, habit of mind.
Instead of proposing direct causal correlations, Lewes thinks in terms of emergent properties,
and of the ways in which their complexity baffles both immediate conceptual figuration and
neat causal sequencing. Thus, in the short passage on “neural groups” quoted above, Lewes,
like a number of his sophisticated contemporaries (W. B. Carpenter and William James
spring to mind), writes not in terms of entities, but of changed patterns of perception, as in a
kaleidoscope. He consistently emphasizes evolving, self-adjusting structures.
This can be a very literary effect. This is partly because it occurs in language, but also
because it attempts to express new relationships outside old boundaries. Both Lewes and
Eliot specialized in this. Here is her celebrated account of the town of Middlemarch into
which Lydgate, her fictional bio-medical researcher, is about to enter:
Old provincial society had its share of this subtle movement: had not only its striking downfalls, its
brilliant young professional dandies who ended by living up an entry with a drab and six children
for their establishment, but also those less marked vicissitudes which are constantly shifting the
boundaries of social intercourse, and begetting new consciousness of interdependence. Some slipped
a little downward, some got higher footing: people denied aspirates, gained wealth, and fastidious
gentleman stood for boroughs; some were caught in political currents, some in ecclesiastical, and
perhaps found themselves surprisingly grouped in consequence; while a few personages or families
that stood with rocky firmness amid all this fluctuation, were slowly presenting new aspects in spite
of solidity, and altering with the double change of self and beholder. Municipal town and rural
parish gradually made fresh threads of connection – gradually, as the old stocking gave way to the
savings-bank, and the worship of the solar guinea became extinct, while squires and baronets, and
even lords who had once lived blamelessly afar from the civic mind, gathered the faultiness of closer
acquaintanceship. Settlers, too, came from distant countries, some with an alarming novelty of skill,
others with an offensive advantage in cunning. In fact, much the same sort of movement and mixture
went on in old England as we find in older Herodotus, who also, in telling what had been, thought it well
to take a woman’s lot for his starting-point; though Io, as a maiden apparently beguiled by attractive
merchandise, was the reverse of Miss Brooke, and in this respect perhaps bore more resemblance to
Rosamond Vincy. (122–23; bk. 1, ch. 11)
This passage emphasizes movement that, as Eliot pointedly puts it, is “constantly shifting the
boundaries.” Like Lewes, she invokes complex optical and perceptual effects – the surprising
grouping of people presenting new aspects, as in a kaleidoscope, or the “double change of
self and beholder” – to register dynamics of change and process and invoke an evolving
environment. Thus, as we try to grasp the complex, multi-faceted nature of the activity being
described, we are shifted between metaphorical registers: from people slipping and climbing,
to optical effects, to economics and, eventually, to the classics. The writing stretches the
conceptual framework in a way that both reflects and evokes the emergent world. I suggest
that this is an activity cognate with the stretching of the conceptual boundaries in psychology
attempted by Lewes and like-minded contemporaries.
What boundaries are at stake here? We might note the following. First, obviously enough,
there is the boundary between mind and body or brain. Lewes is an emphatic interactionist,
opposing the bounded, hierarchical models of spiritualists and iatromechanists alike. Second,
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there are issues about how causality is modelled in complex systems. The structure figured –
it is no more than that – by Lewes is one whose conceptual architecture has much in common
with the evolutionary ideas he enthusiastically embraced. It is a world of emergent rather
than stable properties, of structural indeterminacy, of fissile, productive messiness. It does
not belong to a world of smooth, definable lines with neat boundaries. By contrast Huxley,
in his psychological thinking, appears to have thought little of the impact of evolutionary
argument on psychological concepts.
But there is a third boundary in play that arises from thinking at the edges of knowledge –
or, more strictly, the edges of ignorance. These nineteenth-century theorists were working
at the speculative edge of the known in scientific and conceptual terms. They were trying to
glimpse into being not the details of a known world, but the very terms under which it might
be conceived. Lewes and his contemporaries could not describe, either in much detail or with
much certainty, the operations of even the rudimentary functions of the brain. Instead, they
struggled with the conceptual architecture of ways of looking at the phenomena in which
they were interested. It is this – which is in large part not directly a matter of extra-linguistic
knowledge – which is often at the forefront of attention in reading these writers. Apropos
of this, Kant, who influenced British debate about psychological issues a good deal, has a
suggestive phrase in the Introduction to Part One of The Critique of Judgement (1790). He
speaks (the context of discussion is exactly the issue of what we can know about the processes
of our own minds) of the way in which psychological conceptions are “unfathomable, though
still thinkable” (23). It is this sense of being at the edge of issues without certainty of solution
that haunts, and enriches, a good deal of Victorian debate. The manifest form of this is the
search for conceptual structures beyond old boundaries.
This engages a fourth boundary: that between them and us, the Victorian and the modern,
because the conceptual struggle to grasp new forms of relationship between entities like mind
and brain whose commensurability is difficult to conceive, is still current. What follows
suggests ways in which the boundaries between then and now may be less firm than one
might think. Here is another shrewd Victorian commentator on such issues:
But between these purely mental inquiries, and those which regard the physical nature of man, there
lies an interspace; destined ever to continue such; yet greatly narrowed, we may affirm, by the
remarkable discoveries regarding the functions of the nervous system, and their relation to mental as
well as physical phenomena, which of late years have given a new character to physiology. While
recognising still a line and limit, impassable by human reason or research, we have approached nearer
to it on this side, and are justified in believing that the same investigation, further pursued, will bring
us closer to the boundary. (Holland 614)
Sir Henry Holland was a distinguished figure in Victorian medical and psychological circles.
He was also well known to Eliot and Lewes. In fact, he was their doctor. A man of urbane
disposition, a celebrated traveller, perhaps a government agent when abroad, widely read and
wide thinking, his books, scattered over a long career from the 1830s to the 1880s, provide a
commentary on developing arguments in Victorian psycho-physiology (Rylance ch. 4). He
was, as a senior member of the medical establishment and the Whig hierarchy, at once an
insider and a man of open opinions, including the recognition of psychosomatic illness and
its treatment. (Psychosomatic illness, of course, is an instance of mind-body interaction par
excellence.)
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His views in this passage are outwardly conformist: “interspace,” “line and limit,” and
“boundary” come from the vocabulary of the classic insistence that mind and matter are
distinct. “Interspace” is an unusual choice (it was in fact a very recent word dating, according
to the OED, from 1847), but gulfs, gaps, and chasms feature regularly as big obstacles in
the way of the adventurous traveller in the conceptual landscape of Victorian psychology.
However, this passage is notable in other ways.
One interesting feature is the way it tiptoes around its own problem. It may be (as it
formally proposes) that it is “destined” that an “interspace” should ever lie between mind
and body, but the choice of that new word is artful. Interspace, in one of its leading senses,
means a space put between. It is the act of an agent not of nature. The qualifier about “line
and limit” reinforces this. The “line and limit,” it turns out, is, as Kant also believed, a feature
of our conceptual capacity (“impassable by human reason or research,” Holland writes),
rather than a matter of ontological antecedence or natural fact. So there is ambivalence at
the heart of Holland’s attitudes. His approach in fact is caught in an epistemological version
of Zeno’s paradox. He seems to insist that the boundary is there: real, thick, absolute, and
impenetrable. Nonetheless, we seem to get relentlessly closer to crossing it. This asymptotic
drift is perhaps mirrored in the loping sentences that seem to advance sneakily by clausal
revision, ever closer to that celebrated boundary which the wanderer can never quite cross.
There is a kind of trochaic rhythm to his ideas, up and down, as though he wants to assert
the conventional wisdom, and accommodate its opposite in a lower tone.
I find Holland’s a contextually adroit, rather than evasive, meliorism. It is a supple way of
accommodating the classic prejudice in Victorian theory against material explanation. It also
confronts the difficulty that scientists were in fact unable to cross these formidable boundaries
with demonstrated knowledge. Nowadays many researchers are less prone to caution. Here
is Antonio R. Damasio, a widely admired writer on the problem of consciousness, in a
symposium on “The Hidden Mind” in a recent issue of Scientific American:
I would be foolish to make predictions about what can and cannot be discovered or about when
something might be discovered and the route of discovery. Nevertheless, it is probably true to say that
by 2050 sufficient knowledge of biological phenomena will have wiped out the traditional dualistic
separations of body/brain, body/mind and brain/mind. (9)
This at least has the virtue of being a testable hypothesis – eventually. But in its bullish way it is
treading the same path as Henry Holland towards what now appear to be shrinking boundaries
figured by Damasio in the tiny punctual slash marks between “body/brain, body/mind and
brain/mind.”
However, this cannot be a matter of a more confident and knowledge-rich science
bulldozing obstacles. At a conceptual level it still demands careful footwork which indicates
in some respects that the problems encountered by Victorian thinkers persist in imposing
ways. One leading theorist, the neurobiologist Gerald Edelman, is compelling for present
purposes because in some crucial respects his work is conceptually adjacent to initiatives
taken by leading Victorian theorists.
That Edelman’s ideas do not lend themselves to quick summary is inevitable, but the
founding principles are important. Edelman holds that brain structure and brain systems
develop their morphology in an evolutionary way through iterative interaction. The brain
being composed of multiple sheets of neurons, which of these is selected for use will depend,
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he argues, upon the brain’s developmental experience. In the same way that, in biological
evolution, certain kinds of reproductive process favor adaptation to, and success in, particular
environments, so:
In neuronal group selection, differences in connectivity, synaptic structure, and the morphology of
neurons in the primary repertoire, after confrontation with different correlated patterns of signals from
the environment, lead to differences in the probabilities of their responses as groups. This reflects
changes in the patterns of their synaptic strengths. There is differential reproduction in one case
[biological evolution], differential amplification in the other [neuronal group selection]. (97)
These ideas make demands. They require some specific knowledge (for example, that a
neuron is a nerve cell and a synapse the connection between neurons), as well as an awareness
that the brain functions as a structure by virtue of millions of interacting synaptic connections.
The individual character of this functioning is related to the nature of these interactions. But
the important leap is conceptual. Edelman is reflecting upon how particular, functioning
structures arise from multiple potentials. In biological evolution reproduction regulates
change. But the long temporal dimension does not apply to the evolutionary morphology
of the individual brain. It is not a question, therefore, of death and replacement. Instead,
as Edelman says, it is an issue of the relative amplification of certain elements. The brain’s
structure, and the psychological systems that attend it, evolve in experience. The activation of
certain neuronal groups leads to further use through reiteration: “Nervous system behaviour
is to some extent self-generated in loops; brain activity leads to movement, which leads to
further sensation and perception and still further movement. The layers and loops between
them are the most intricate of any object we know, and they are dynamic; they continually
change” (29).
Edelman has an arresting metaphor for this: “the chemical and electrical dynamics of
the brain,” he writes, “resemble the sound and light patterns and the movement and growth
of a jungle more than they do the activities of an electric company” (29). Thus, his thinking
breaks sharply from the iatromechanical tradition. His conception depends upon multiple
populations, amongst which selection occurs, rather than the lean, cased systems of machines.
These are self-developing, adaptable, self-revising processes whose agency is the selections
made amongst vast variety and possibility. Machine systems cannot tolerate this degree of
indeterminacy. Edelman’s ideas require spacious structures envisaged as networks or eco-
systems like a jungle rather than taut hierarchies and elegant command sequences. When
imagining such structures, boundaries inevitably become leaky because in networks it is
hard to distinguish where one component ends and another begins. Evolutionary eco-systems
can only operate with diverse, multi-sided interactions. In this context it makes little sense to
maintain any but the most porous sense of boundaries either between phenomena, or between
the stages of a process. A different kind of conceptual environment is in play. Edelman’s own
metaphors, sampled above, give the lead: groups, layers, loops, patterns, jungles.
Edelman describes, in complex and detailed ways, the evolution of sophisticated higher
order activities such as perception and memory on this basis. Once the system of organized
correlations between sheets of neurones gets to a certain complexity and sophistication, the
system is not only able to correlate data from diverse sources to generate multi-aspect brain
maps of things and events, it is also able to re-enter these structures to reorganize information.
It has been claimed that Edelman has still not answered the pressing question about what
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consciousness is, as a qualitatively and maybe ontologically distinct property, in a system
that would appear to function happily without it (Searle 48–51). Nevertheless, these ideas
carry major implications for how psychological concepts are developed.
One major implication is that concepts do not, as in some classical theories of
categorization, arise by natural self-election from phenomena themselves. Instead they are
products of selection amongst alternatives. For example, recognition, either at the level of
the neurone or as a cognitive act, carries little of distinctive informational or instructive value
for Edelman. It is, he says, “a kind of adaptive matching” against a population of available
alternatives (81). This does not mean that perception and conceptualization occur by some
crude best fit principle whereby new experience is shoehorned into existing, more or less
ill-fitting categories. If that were so, the generation of new ideas would be a clumsy, plodding
and probably dysfunctional business.
Instead, for Edelman, categorizations, concept formation and the symbolic structures that
express them, are the products of selective refinement and integration amongst what, from
one point of view, appear to be fraying and inconstant elements. Edelman has no patience
with smooth computer models: “Psychological work indicates . . . that computer views of the
mind cannot deal with categories of the mind and of language (see any poem) that fail to
reflect categories in the world. Individuals understand events and categories in more than one
way and sometimes the ways are inconsistent” (236–37). What he calls the objectivist view
of cognition and language (the view that symbolic or conceptual entities directly “correspond
to entities and categories in the world” [232]) breaks down because it cannot operate at the
fuzzy edge of understanding, at the point where concepts, categories and symbols become
hybrid or disheveled, but still remain productive. In language, metaphor – “the referral of the
properties of one thing to those of another in a different domain” (237) – is a creative case in
point. But it is only a special instance of a general truth:
Meaning simply refuses to be bound by a fixed set of terms in a specific coding system. . . . the
mind is not a mirror of nature. Thought is not the manipulation of abstract symbols whose semantics
are justified by unambiguous reference to things in the world. Classical categories do not serve
in most cases of conceptual categorisation and they do not satisfactorily account for the actual
assignment of categories by human beings. There is no unambiguous mapping between the world and
our categorization of it. (237)
The convergence between these propositions and those of G. H. Lewes and some of his
contemporaries is striking. Lewes, it will be recalled, also developed a theory of “neural
groups” in which “the group is never a fixed structure; it is only a disposition of the elements
which is easily reformed.” He too pictured a dynamic and morphologically evolving system;
he too shared George Eliot’s need to revise conceptual categories actively in language to keep
pace with (to adapt Edelman slightly) the “ambiguous mapping between the world and our
categorization of it.”
What I am pointing to is not a matter of prolepsis or even ancestry. It is a shared quality of
intellectual enquiry. It may be possible for the intellectual historian to follow a detailed route
between, say, Lewes, William James (who learned much from Lewes), and Edelman who
takes James as inspiration. (James’s influential redefinition of consciousness as a process
rather than a substance is a key step [Edelman 37]). But this is beside my point, and in any
case the tools of the trade in neurobiology, and the range and depth of scientific knowledge,
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have changed so enormously it would be no more than tracing the resemblances between a
coracle and a catamaran. Both may float, but they do so in different waters.
Instead it is, as I say, a question of modes of inquiry, of how, especially at points of change
in the ways in which the human mind is understood, conceptual structures are revised and old
boundaries give way. The work of William James is a landmark for many reasons: not least in
the way he crossed and re-crossed the boundaries between European and American thought
as well as those between the psychology of consciousness and the neurobiological basis.
In “The Functions of the Brain,” one of the less well-known chapters of his Principles of
Psychology (1890), we see him trying to evoke a pluralistic, multi-faceted environment. What
are particularly interesting are his efforts to evoke and refine elusive concepts in language:
We thus see that the postulate of Meynert and Jackson which we started with on p. 41 is on the
whole most satisfactorily corroborated by subsequent objective research. The highest centres do
probably contain nothing but arrangements for representing impressions and movements, and other
arrangements for coupling the activity of these arrangements together. Currents pouring in from
the sense-organs first excite some arrangements, which in turn excite others, until at last a motor
discharge downwards of some sort occurs. When this is once clearly grasped there remains little
ground for keeping up that old controversy about the motor zone, as to whether it is in reality motor
or sensitive. The whole cortex, inasmuch as currents run through it, is both. All the currents probably
have feelings going with them, and sooner or later bring movements about. In one aspect, then, every
centre is afferent, in another efferent, even the motor cells of the spinal cord having these two aspects
inseparably conjoined. Marique, and Exner and Paneth, have shown that by cutting round a ‘motor’
centre and so separating it from the influence of the rest of the cortex, the same disorders are produced
as by cutting it out, so that really it is only the mouth of the funnel, as it were, through which the
stream of innervation, starting from elsewhere, pours; consciousness accompanying the stream, and
being mainly of things seen if the stream is strongest occipitally, of things heard if it is the strongest
temporally, of things felt, etc., if the stream occupies most intensely the ‘motor zone’. It seems to me
that some broad and vague formulation like this is as much as we can safely venture on in the present
state of science; and in subsequent chapters I expect to give confirmatory reasons for my view. (73)
The “postulate” that first appears at page 41 is one of systemic parallelism in the
psycho-physiological apparatus. Just as sensory and motor systems operate in tandem, so
do sensations and ideas. Indeed: “There is complete parallelism between the two analyses,”
writes James, and he presents a diagram of the sensory and ideational response of a child
touching a candle flame. The key point is that “the same diagram of little dots, circles, or
triangles joined by lines symbolizes equally well the cerebral and mental processes: the dots
stand for cells or ideas, the lines for fibres or associations.” Compared to Edelman this is
crude (as James realized: he adds “we shall have later to criticize this analysis so far as it
relates to the mind”). It appears to posit an identity between cells and ideas, as though the
former were simply material encapsulations of the latter. But it is a clear expression of the
identity theory: that mental and physical are, as Lewes put it, the convex and concave of one
bending plane.
In the more substantial quotation we see a more sophisticated rendering of this. Ideas
are no longer crudely embodied in cells. Instead the brain is a structure exchanging and
manipulating information and representations (the key sentence is the one italicized by
James). The idea is once more close in conception to that of Edelman. The rest of the
passage embellishes it. Again, the key principles are those of identity and parallelism: “In
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one aspect, then, every centre is afferent, in another efferent.” Afferent nerves are those
that transmit inward; efferent are those that transmit outward. James’s point is that the
“centres” he is trying to describe can be both, and the metaphor he chooses is optical,
like that adopted by George Eliot in the passage from Middlemarch cited above. Looked at
one way the phenomenon appears like this, looked at another way it appears like that – like
the concave and convex sides of a plane. This is not a question of crossing a boundary from
one state to another, but of changing the aspect with the function.
I would argue that the rest of this passage embodies this idea as rhetoric. As James says, we
are dealing with “a broad and vague formulation,” the only kind the science of his day will per-
mit. What is therefore striking about the passage is the congeries or aggregation of metaphors
he uses. This rhetorical habit is common in James (the quotation might, in fact, be expanded
over several pages, or other examples produced [see for instance 112–14 on the physiology
of habit]). The careful citation of references gestures towards secure empirical support, but
in fact they only punctuate a restless evocation of a neurological system that is really a new
conceptual environment, a way of thinking rather than a product of discovery. In this case – in
fact in almost all such cases in James – this is an energy system, and its nature is suggested by
dynamic verbs and rapidly switching metaphors. Thus, here, we have excited energy exchange
in various forms: running motors and engines, flowing and cascading water, networks of
sluices and funnels, electricity. Deliberately, it is unclear whether the “currents” mentioned
in the passage belong to water or to electricity. In fact the two were closely related and James
exploits the equivocation. Nineteenth-century electrical engineers understood the movement
of current directly on analogy with that of water. One form this took was the habit, in Victorian
circuit diagrams, of indicating the current’s direction by drawing small swimmers alongside
the lines representing the wiring. In James’s evocation of this amorphous conceptual environ-
ment, even the boundaries between forms of matter and energy appear dangerously to dissolve.
And so we come to the last of the boundaries addressed by this essay. Because Victorian
thinking about mind-body interaction, and about the conceptual architecture appropriate to
describe it was, as James put it, a matter of “broad and vague formulations,” it follows that,
in part, these are issues of rhetorical management. This is not a disparaging assessment (nor
does it imply, as Edelman’s jungle indicates, that modern conceptions are free of this). But it
is one that brings us close to the boundary that purportedly separates science from literature.
In the Victorian period one can observe similar conceptual reconfigurations as writers of
both literary and psychological texts try to grasp the mind as a new object of knowledge.
We might expect this in George Eliot, who has already been cited. But she is far from alone.
Here is another:
I knew what the result of such an experiment would be. I, to whom nature had denied the impromptu
faculty; who, in public, was by nature a cypher; whose time of mental activity, even when alone was
not under the meridian sun; who needed the fresh silence of morning, or the recluse peace of evening,
to win from the Creative Impulse one evidence of his presence, one proof of his force; I, with whom
that impulse was the most intractable, the most capricious, the most maddening of masters (him
before me always excepted) – a deity, which sometimes, under circumstances apparently propitious,
would not speak when questioned, would not hear when appealed to, would not, when sought, be
found; but would stand, all cold, all indurated, all granite, a dark Baal with carven lips and blank eye-
balls, and breast like the stone face of a tomb; and again, suddenly, at some turn, some sound, some
long-trembling sob of the wind, at some rushing past of an unseen stream of electricity, the irrational
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demon would wake unsolicited, would stir strangely alive, would rush from its pedestal like a disturbed
Dagon, calling to its votary for a sacrifice, whatever the hour – to its victim for some blood or some
breath, whatever the circumstance or scene – rousing its priest, treacherously promising vaticination,
perhaps filling its temple with a strange hum of oracles, but sure to give half the significance to fateful
winds, and grudging, to the desperate listener even a miserable remnant – yielding it sordidly, as
though each word had been a drop of the deathless ichor of its own dark veins. (Bronte¨ 445; ch. 30)
This is from Charlotte Bronte¨’s Villette (1853). It is a characteristic piece of psychological
self-analysis by Lucy Snowe written at a period when introspection was still regarded in
mainstream opinion as the chief means of arriving at psychological knowledge. Indeed the
passage uses some of the features of orthodox psychological reportage: the use of “faculty”
in the second sentence was a semi-technical term as we have seen, and psychological writing
was accustomed to capitalizing entities such as “Creative Impulse,” as here. (There is also
the question of the broader vocabulary – indurated, vaticination, Baal, Dagon, ichor, estrade,
for example – which makes a particular kind of unusual technical demand.) But there are
two features of this passage to which I wish to call particular attention. The first is that this
is once again, as with James and Lewes, a turbulent, energy-filled evocation of mind, one
that switches its attention from the relatively passive notion of the faculty (i.e., the mind’s
tranquil, native attribute) to the stormy issue of a driving “Impulse” (also Lewes’s key word)
which is changing and creating perception. The second feature is that, as with James (or
indeed George Eliot), the revisionary understanding the passage proposes is matched not
only by vigor in syntax and tone, but by turbulence in metaphor and register, as though the
conceptual foundations for understanding are being inconclusively but necessarily reworked.
Thus there is a hectic metaphorical slide: from deities, to rock, to statuary, to wind, to the
water and electricity duo again, to demons, to a scene of sacrifice. Each of these has its
own distinctive, signifying impact that could be elaborated (the paganism, for instance, is
very striking). But the major point is the headlong, revisionary change the passage enacts, as
though there were no clear, sufficient ways of describing the mind’s activity other than by,
in a somewhat Romantic spirit, mutations in the terms of understanding.
Charlotte Bronte¨ was not concerned to make a contribution to psychological theory. This
writing is therefore in some respects quite unlike the kind of thing that Lewes or James
undertook. But it is a substantial collateral indication of the way in which many Victorian
writers, working in adjacent areas, undertook exciting and comprehensive revisions to the
boundaries of accepted understanding in psychological issues. This in itself is part of a
much larger change in Victorian thinking, one succinctly described by Louis Menand in The
Metaphysical Club, his recent, exhilarating history of philosophical pragmatism. It is, Menand
argues, a change between thinking in terms of “types and essences, which is prescriptive” to
that in terms of the “language of statistics and probability, which is predictive.” In this new
cognitive environment: “Relations will be more important than categories; functions, which
are variable, will be more important then purposes, which are fixed in advance; transitions
will be more important than boundaries; sequences will be more important than hierarchies”
(123–24). It is this larger change to which Victorian psychological thinking contributed and
responded in such an enlivening way. That the issues they raised persist is no matter for
regret. It is an essential fact about self-understanding.
University of Exeter
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